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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
TATES, INC.
Plaintiff-A

ppellant,

vs.
LITTLE AMERICA REFINING
CO., A Corporation dba L I T T L E
AMERICA,
Defendant-Respondent.
B R I E F OF

Case No.
13681
J

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE A N D
D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for
the balance due on a contract for the purchase of a bus.
The Court held that the plaintiff's acceptance of a check
for an amount less than that due resulted in an accord
and satisfaction and dismissed the plaintiff's action and
denied recovery by the plaintiff. The Court also denied
plaintiff's claim for $845.00 damages to a bus loaned
to defendant. There is no dispute concerning the existence of the contract, the original contract price of $28,514.37, nor the amount paid by defendant of $25,107.11.
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There is no issue involving breach of contract or cancellation of the contract since both parties sought performance of the contract.
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Plaintiff seeks to reverse the decision of the lower
court and prays for a judgment in its favor for the sum
of $3,407.26 plus interest at the rate of 18% per annum
from delivery date of the bus January 16, 1973 to
present, costs of this proceeding and reasonable attorney's fees and the sum of $845.00 for damages to its
loaner bus with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from January 16,1973 to date.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 21st day of January, 1972, the defendantrespondent, Little America, entered into an agreement
to purchase a new bus from plaintiff-appellant, Tates,
Inc. for the sum of $26,176.66 without State or Federal
tax. With Federal tax, the balance to be paid was $28,514.37. In its letter of January 12, 1972 (Ex. I P )
setting forth specifications, the plaintiff stated in regards to delivery:
" I was talking to our Madsen Factory
and find we could make approximate 45 day
delivery on the chassis and about the same time
on the body after we received the chassis. Or
approximate 90 day delivery after receipt of
order."
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The purchase order was signed by Mr. Knight,
Executive Vice President of defendant, Little America,
on January 21, 1972 (Ex. 2 P ) . H e had been dealing
principally with Mr. Knaus and Mr. Urie, representatives of plaintiff, Tates, Inc.
The Madsen plant which builds the chassis encountered delays in production and the bus was not
ready for delivery until January 16, 1973. During this
delay period, the representatives of plaintiff and defendant had constant contact. Mr. Knight of defendant
company urged delivery and Mr. Knaus of plaintiff
company regularly contacted the Madsen company
trying to get delivery of the bus (R. 52,61). The defendant did not cancel the contract, but on the contrary
continued to affirm the contract and sought delivery
as soon as possible.
When Madsen finished its part of the contract, it
billed plaintiff for its costs and plaintiff billed defendant for part payment. After some delay and discussions, defendant paid $10,000.00 in a check made out to
plaintiff and Madsen dated November 11, 1972 (Ex.
5D). At the time the check was given to plaintiff, Mr.
Knaus and Mr. Knight discussed the completion of the
bus and in Mr. Knight's own words, Mr. Knaus felt
confident the bus would be completed by the end of
November (R.99).
In order to assist the defendant as a courtesy (R.
60) but without being obligated the plaintiff bought
a used, exceptionally clean bus in Boise, Idaho brought
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it to Salt Lake for defendant's use in July, 1972. The
bus cost $1,816.00 (R.57-59). The bus was in good running condition when delivered but was burned up by
defendant who had to have it repaired and claims the
cost of the repairs against the plaintiff in the amount
of $239.76 (Ex. 4 D ) . Bus was returned to plaintiff
near December, 1972 with motor completely burned
out, costing plaintiff $845.00 which plaintiff claims
should be paid by defendant.
After November the defendant rented a bus and
claims the plaintiff should pay the cost of renting the
bus which is $3,167.50, which when added to $239.76
totals $3,407.26 (Ex. 6D).
The new bus was delivered to defendant January
16, 1973 and a delivery receipt and bill was signed by
defendant's representative, Dave Timlinson, stating the
total price of $28,514.37 and calling for payment of
18% interest, collection costs and attorney's fees if required for collection (Ex. 3 P ) . Mr. Timlinson drove
the bus away and that delivery receipt and Tates official
billing were sent to defendant on or soon after January
16, 1973. The billing called for payment of a balance
of $18,514.37 (Ex. 8D).
On or about February 12, 1973 at Mr. Knight's
request he and Mr. Knaus met to go over the matter
of defendant's expenses and as Mr. Knight testified:
" . . . I had accumulated my expenses since that
date (Nov. 30) and I enumerated those and
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told him that these were expenses that we incurred. And he said that they should be put
down and they would go back to the manufacturer so they—to see what they could do
about it and that we would go from there/'
(R. 100). (Italics added.)
Mr. Knight did not know if he actually went through
the bills then or not, but prepared them for Mr. Knaus
as part of his letter of February 12, 1973 so that Mr.
Knaus would have them to submit to the manufacturer.
Mr. Knaus received the letter of February 12, 1973
(Ex. 6D) and submitted it to the manufacturer as
promised. H e was not bound by them nor did he receive
them as an ultimatum but expected them and received them to send on to the manufacturer and "go
from there".
The defendants sent a check for $15,107.11 dated
February 17, 1973 (Ex. 7D) which p l a i n t i f f
credited to the defendants' account on Wednesday,
February 21, 1973 (Ex. 8D). I t was received as a payment on the account while waiting the outcome of a
demand on the manufacturer. On or about February 21,
1973 defendant was billed for the balance due of $3,407.26 (Ex. 8D). On Tuesday, February 27, 1973 an
office note was made to see Mr. Knight, an appointment
was made by phone and the appointment kept on Monday, March 5, 1973 at which time Mr. Knaus renewed
his demand for the money yet due of $3,407.26 and Mr.
Knight stated he wasn't going to pay it. (R. 92, 93).
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The manufacturer had refused to waive the balance
due of $3,407.26 and threatened to sue plaintiff. This
action was then started to recover the balance due.
ARGUMENT

n

POINT I
T H E R E WAS A COMPLETE CONTRACT
B E T W E E N T H E P A R T I E S REQUIRING
T H E D E F E N D A N T TO PAY P L A I N T I F F
$28,514.37. T H E CONTRACT WAS NEVER
VOIDED, CANCELLED OR A L T E R E D BY
T H E P A R T I E S AND UPON D E L I V E R Y OF
T H E BUS W I T H O U T OBJECTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF T H E BILLING AT
TIME OF D E L I V E R Y T H E PERFORMANCE
WAS COMPLETED AND T H E F U L L BALANCE OF T H E CONTRACT PRICE WAS D U E
AND OWING.
As mentioned above there is no dispute concerning
the contract price for the purchase of the bus as being
$28,514.37. Nor is there any dispute concerning the fact
that defendant paid only $25,107.11 leaving a balance
unpaid in the amount of $3,407.26.
The defendant claims the plaintiff agreed to make
delivery of the bus in 90 days. This is not the case. The
plaintiff never did guarantee nor even agree to make
delivery in 90 days but merely relayed to the purchaser
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what the factory had indicated it might could do. Mr.
Knaus wrote in his letter of January 12, 1972:
"I was talking to our Madsen Factory add
find we could make, approximate 45 day delivery on the chassis and about the same time
on the body after we received the chassis. Or
approximate 90 day delivery after receipt of
order." (Ex. I P )
Note the days are stated as approximate 45 days
and approximate 90 days. Even if we should concede
ultimate delivery was not within approximately 90 days
the fact is the defendant never sought to cancel the contract for breach or any other reason but continued to
confirm the contract.
Mr. Knight stated in answer to cross examination:
"P

before or during the summer of '72 or

the fall or the winter of '72 did you ever tell
him that he had breached his contract and that
you were not going to comply with it?
A.

No.

Q.

In fact, you wanted that bus, did you not?

A.

Yes.

Q. Did you find out how much it would cost
you if you ordered a new bus of similar quality
and ascertain what you might be up against
in that regard?
A.

Yes.
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Q. Would it be quite a bit in excess of what
you have already bargained for ?
A. Yes and no. I priced a Flexible bus and
it was more. I priced another type of bus and
it was in the same neighborhood.
Q. I n any regard, you decided you would go
with the contract you had originated with these
parties, did you not?
A.

Yes." (R. 123)

I n its answer to interrogatories paragraph 4 defendants acknowledge the contract, the contract price and
the balance of $3,407.26. (R.18)
No new contracts ever were agreed to or made up.
The direct examination of Mr. Knaus reads as follows:
Q. During your conversation with Mr.
Knight either before or after delivery of the
bus, was there ever any new contract made up ?
A.

No." (R. 74)

Mr. Knaus gave the same answer in response to
cross examination concerning either a written or oral
new contract. (R. 75)
Mr. Urie of Tates, Inc. on direct examination
stated :
"Q. Are you aware of any other documents
that may have changed that purchase order or
the agreement connected with it?
A.

I am not.
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Q.

Are there any to your knowledge?

A. There are none to my knowledge." (R.
79)
The plaintiff's representatives regularly checked
on production and demanded delivery but could not
secure delivery for defendant at any earlier date. (R.
52,61,123,124)
The defendants accepted delivery of the bus on
January 16, 1973, (R. 64) by sending a duly authorized representative as conceded by counsel for defendant,
Mr. Bird, who stated: "Admit he got into the bus and
drove away also admit he was our employee for that
purpose." (R. 78)
Mr. Urie was present when bus was delivered. Mr.
Timlin-son, who picked up the bus, stated he was an employee. He signed the original of the Exhibit 3 combination invoice, billing and delivery receipt as an agent
and "Took delivery of the bus and left our premises".
(R. 77, 78) There was no objection to the billing for
$28,514.37 at the time of delivery. (R, 79) Defendants
answer to interrogatories reads:
"Q. Did defendant or any of its agents refuse
or object to delivery at the time the bus was
delivered?
A. Little America and its
refuse or object to delivery at
was delivered. I t was received
January 16, 1973, and it was

agents did not
the time the bus
by the driver on
necessary to re-
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turn the bus to plaintiffs for repair of defects
on January 28, 29 and 30, 1973." (R. 18)
Q. Did defendants or any of its agents notify
the plaintiff at any time that it would not
accept delivery of the bus. . ?
A. Little America and its agents did not at
any time contend they would not accept delivery, but, to the contrary, were very anxious
to receive delivery of the new bus at the earliest
possible d a t e . . . " (R. 18)
There was no objection to the billing made on January 16,1973 as shown by the interrogatories paragraph
7.
"Q. Did defendant or any of its agents object
to the billing made on January 16, 1973 or
thereafter . . .?
A. Little America did not object to the billing made on January 16, 1973. However,
Little America did answer this statement with
a letter dated February 12, 1973 . . . which
itemized the expenses incurred by Little
America from December 1, 1972, until the
bus was received in operable condition. • ."
(R. 18, 19)
The contract as originally agreed upon in January
1972 was still fully in force and effect at the time of
delivery of the bus January 16, 1973 and this completed
performance by the plaintiff leaving a balance due and
owing by the defendant of $18,514.37 for which the
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defendant was immediately billed. (Ex. 8D) The plaintiff was entitled to receive any payment made thereafter
as a payment on the account. The defendant was obligated to make full payment of $18,514.37.*
The invoice signed by defendants' agent on January 16, 1973 provided for payment of interest at the
rate of 18% per annum, collection costs and reasonable
attorneys fees if action is necessary for collection.
Restatement of Contracts, Section One, defines a
contract as:
"a promise or a set of promises for the breach
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes a duty."
Section 310 states:
"where the duty of a party to a contract has
been discharged by reason of the application
of the rules stated in this chapter, he is again
subjected to the duty if he manifests a willingness to go on with the contract in spite of facts
operating to discharge him, and the other party
either gives a sufficient consideration therefor
or the rules of Sections 88, 90 or 298 are applicable."
POINT II
T H E COURT W A S IN ERROR I N F I N D I N G A N ACCORD A N D S A T I S F A C T I O N B E -
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TWEEN T H E PARTIES W H I C H PERMITT E D T H E D E F E N D A N T S TO P A Y O N L Y
$25,107.11 R A T H E R T H A N T H E F U L L CONT R A C T P R I C E O F $28,514.37.
A. T H E R E W A S N E V E R A N ACCORD,
A G R E E M E N T , OR C O M P R O M I S E TO S E T T L E F O R L E S S T H A N T H E F U L L CONTRACT PRICE.
1 Am J u r 2d, "Accord and Satisfaction," Section
One states:
"An accord and satisfaction may more
properly be said to be a method of discharging
a contract... by substituting for such contract
or cause of action an agreement for the satisfaction thereof and the execution of such substituted agreement."
"To constitute an accord and satisfaction
there must be an offer in full satisfaction of
the obligation, accompanied by such acts and
declarations as amount to a condition that if it
is accepted, it is to be in full satisfaction, and
the condition must be such that the party to
whom the offer is made is bound to understand
that if he accepts it, he does so subject to conditions imposed/'
"The accord is the agreement and the satisfaction is the signature execution or performance of such agreement," (Italics added)
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Section Two indicates an accord and satisfaction
is similar to a compromise and settlement.
The plaintiff never agreed at any time to settle
for a sum less than the full contract price. On the contrary the plaintiff continually refused defendant's request to discount $3,407.26.
The record shows that the first significant conversation concerning a discount occurred February 12,
1973. Mr. Knight testifying on direct stated:
"Q. You wrote a letter on February 12,1973,
which is exhibit 6-D; that's your signature,
isn't it?
A. That is.
Q. I n connection with that letter were there
conversations?
A. There were.
Q.
A.

Between you and who else?
Mr. Knaus.

Q. Can you remember whether there were
conversations before the letter was prepared
before that date, February 12, or what they
were on that date?
A. I believe we had a phone conversation
prior to that date and I asked Mr. Knaus if I
could meet with him and go over the matter
before we proceeded further. And I believe it
was on February 12th or thereabouts that he
came to my office and we discussed the matter
of the expenses.
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Q. Will you relate the conversation on that
day on that occasion in your office ?
A. Yes . . . I explained that I was taking the
November 30th date because that had been the
date that was promised in association with the
$10,000.00 check; and that I had accumulated
my expenses since that date and I enumerated
those and told him that these were expenses
that we had incurred. And he said that they
should be put down and they would go hack to
the manufacturer so they—to see what they
could do about it and that we would go from

there.
Q. Did you at that conversation exhibit any
of the documentary support for those expenses?
A. I am not sure whether or not I actually
went through the bills or not. I can't recall.
They were attached to my letter of February
12th." (R. 100,101) (Italics added)
"Q. The response of Mr. Knaus was that he
would go back to the manufacturer and see
what could be done and he would go there . . .
A. Not in November. That conversation
occurred in February. (R. 123)
Q. Mr. Knaus said in response to your accumulated expenses and your telling about it
that he would go back to the manufacturer to
see what could be done about it and you could
go from there, isn't that it?
A.

Right." (R. 124) (Italics added)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
This testimony by Mr. Knight, Vice President of
the defendant corporation pursuant to question by his
own attorney and on cross, clearly shows there was no
accord or agreement on February 12, 1973 or before.
When Mr. Knight enumerated the expenses, Mr. Knaus
said, "that they should be put down and they would go
back to the manufacturer so they-to see what they could
do about it and that {(we would go from there/' Apparently that very day Mr. Knight "put down" the expenses in letter for and mailed them to Mr. Knaus,
(Ex. 60) so that he would have something "to go back to
the manufacturer to see what they could do about it"
Obviously the final words "that we would go from
there" shows there was no agreement but a tentative
arrangement whereby a credit would be allowed conditioned on the manufacturers allowing a credit to plaintiff. Mr. Knight had to allow plaintiff time to go back
to the manufacturer so obviously the letter (Ex. 6D)
was not an ultimatum nor a confirmation of a new agreement but merely a statement of expenses, a statement
which the plaintiff needed to send to the manufacturer.
The statement of expenses (Ex. 6D) was sent in response to plaintiff's request to have the expenses "put
down" The letter was received as information and not as
a statement ultimatum or demand to which they were
expected to respond or acquiesce. (R. 100, 101) There
was no accord at the time of the February 12th conversation and there was no accord at the time the letter
dated February 12th was received by plaintiff or latter.
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B. T H E R E W A S N E V E R A S A T I S F A C T I O N OR S E T T L E M E N T O F T H E C L A I M
FOR LESS THAN F U L L PAYMENT.
After receiving a check dated February 17, 1973
for $15,107.11, Mr. Knaus and Mr. Urie became worried
and placed calls to Mr. Knight beginning February 27
and 28, 1973 (R. 91) and finally made an appointment
with Mr. Knight for March 5, 1973. (R. 92) A t that
meeting the discussion centered around the payment of
$3,407.26 as shown by the following answers by Mr.
Urie to his attorney's questions:
"Q. What was the conversation relating to
that you had with Mr. Knight on that appointment at March 5th?
A. The conversation was relating to the payment that was—they said they wouldn't pay.

-

Q.

And what was it?

A.

The amount of $3,407.26.

Q.

And what was said?

A. H e said he felt like that he didn't-wasn't
going to pay us this money and we said we
felt like that he owed it to us." (R. 92, 93)

Mr. Knight verified this conversation by saying
in response to his attorney's question about the meeting:
"A. Mr. Urie and Mr. Knaus came in and
they said they had not been able to do anything
with the manufacturer as far as obtaining any-
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i

thing from him; that in fact the manufacturer
had indicated that he would file an immediate
suit against them if he did not pay and they
were concerned about the license to present the
the manufacturer or whatever the agreement
they had. That they were not in a position to
sustain the loss at Tates and they asked me to
make payment.
There was another element of the conversation
which had to do with the bus that was now in
Wyoming. And they had a document which
they asked me to sign, which document indicated that I had additional amounts due to
them and that if I would sign that they would
sign a document that could go to the State of
Utah to license the vehicle. And I told them
that I did not care to sign that and that I
didn't feel that Little America was in the
position to sustain the loss either. That it was
not our fault that it had been late and we had
incurred these costs and that was where the
conversation ended basically." (R. 103)

The check did not bear any statement on it to the
effect that endorsement or cashing it meant acceptance
as payment in full. Again we do not know when the
check was cashed but it appears the parties had contact
and that the check was merely accepted as payment on
account and not as satisfaction of the account. (Ex. 8D)
I t was quite logical for plaintiff to accept the check as
payment on account because only five days before
Mr. Knight talked with them about going back to the
factory and he knew it would take more than five days.
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The record shows clearly and consistently that
plaintiff agreed only to check with the factory or manufacturer to see if he could get credit on the expenses for
Mr, Knight (R. 69 Lines 14-16, 22-24)
The plaintiff even pressed the matter to the extent
that the manufacturer threatened to sue the plaintiff.
Mr. Urie stated emphatically referring to a conversation
with Mr. Knight, " . . . I told him that the deduction
would not be allowed as far as Tates was concerned in
the amount of $3,407.26." (R. 79) (R. 73)
Obviously there was never an accord nor a satisfaction as shown by plaintiff's consistent and adamant
denial for allowing the deduction requested by defendant.
To further show there was no satisfaction the plaintiff immediately credited the $15,107.11 paid to the
account of defendant on February 21, 1973 and entered
a balance due of $3,407,26 (Ex. 8D) and immediately
so billed the defendant. (R. 79) and so billed defendant
at the end of each month thereafter (R. 79).
There is no evidence indicating when the check was
cashed—the defendant did not produce the original check
or even a copy of it to show dates or endorsements. But
an accord cannot be presumed by either the letter or
acceptance of the check in view of the facts above.
The check contained no statement indicating the
acceptance or cashing of the check would mean payment
in full. There was a stub attached to the check explain-
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ing the computations arriving at the sum of $15,107.11.
(Ex. 7D) This did not surprise or greatly alarm Mr.
Knaus or Mr. Urie at first because of the understanding
that they would try to recover the $3,407.26 from the
factory (R. 100) but there was sufficient concern to
promptly check with Mr. Knight to make sure he did
not misunderstand their position and to clarify the fact
that $3,407.26 was still due. (R. 91, 92, 103)
In order for plaintiff to be held for an accord and
satisfaction it must have accepted the proposal of defendant, this was never done. 17 Am J u r 2nd Contracts,
Section 41 states the principal that an acceptance must
be definite not qualified or conditional. Section 375 in
referring to substantial performance in keeping with
the liberal rule accepted by most modern authorities
holds that:
"Where one party to a contract has received
and retained the benefits of substantial partial
performance of an agreement, the other party
cannot retain the benefits and repudiate the
burdens of the contract and is bound to perform."
Under this rule the defendant is bound to pay the balance due on the contract to the plaintiff.
Probably the best Utah case on the subject is a
1962 case, 13 Ut. 2nd 142 Dillman v. Massey Ferguson,
Inc. In this case the defendant manufacturer agreed
to pay certain bonuses and to buy back certain supply
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parts upon termination of the agency. After an agreement to terminate was consumated and the manufacturer
sent a check which did not cover all of the items to be
paid for. With the check was a letter stating, "the
amount due in full to complete recent buy-back on your
account". Though the contract was to continue to Oct.
31 the contract was modified when appellant voluntarily
agreed to pay a bonus in consideration of respondent's
voluntary termination.
The Supreme Court held that acceptance and cashing of defendant's check by plaintiff after plaintiff
protested that the check did not take care of all that was
due him under the agreement with defendant did not
amount to accord and satisfaction, though a letter was
sent by defendant with the check stated that the check
represented amount due in full to complete recent buy
back by defendant, where dispute was not as to the
amount due plaintiff by defendant for items which were
bought back by defendant, but as to whether defendant
breached contract by refusing to buy back items rejected by defendant.
The court further said:
"In view of the dispute in this case as to the
purpose of the check, the trial court could believe, as it did, that the sending and acceptance
of the check was in no way related to anything
other than a payment for items actually bought
back by appellant."
The Court quoted favorably 1 Am J u r Section 31:
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"In some instances, the words 'in full payment'
or those of similar tenor, do not necessarily
import or prove an accord, for it may be that
there is more than one account pending between
the parties, or the check may be qualified by
concurrent transactions or letters..."
There is a strong similarity between our case and the
Dillman case except that Tates has a much stronger
position as plaintiff than Dillman had in that the letter
sent to Tates by defendant did not accompany the
check and was not related to the check in any way. I t
did not even mention or apparently anticipate a check
and in no way controlled the disposition of the check.
The letter did not contain any controlling words such
as "in full payment" nor did the check. Certainly the
court here can, as in the Dillman case, treat the check
as "in no way related to anything other than payment
for items actually bought back. . ." or payment on account. As mentioned above the letter was sent for another purpose and not to direct the handling of the
check. In our case as in the Dillman case the plaintiff
promptly advised the defendant that the check was not
being accepted as payment in full. Section 18 of I Am
J u r 2nd states:
"The fact that a remittance by check purporting to be "in full" is accepted and used does
not result in an accord and satisfaction if the
claim involved is liquidated and undisputed,
under the general accepted rule that an accord
and satisfaction does not result from the part-
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payment of a liquidated and
claim."
>

undisputed

Some further pertinent section from 1 Am J u r 2nd are
as follows:
>
Section 11 "The question whether there has
been an accord and satisfaction is ordinarily
a question of intention...."
Obviously there was no agreement nor any intention on
the part of plaintiff, Tates, Inc., to settle for less than
the full balance due and owing of $3,40.26:
Section 12 ". . . I t is universally recognized
that one of the essential requirements of a valid
accord and satisfaction is that it be based upon
or supported by a good or valuable consideration." ". . . where the subject of the accord and
satisfaction is a liquidated demand and the
creditor has accepted an amount less than his
demand, the accord and satisfaction can, in
absence of statute, be supported only if some
consideration outside of the amount paid in
satisfaction exists."
Section 14 " A valid accord and satisfaction
may result from an offer of payment of money
upon an unliquidated demand conditioned
upon its being received in full satisfaction of
the indebtedness and the acceptance thereof by
the creditor, and conversely, and accord satisfaction will not result if the offer was not
made or accepted with the intent that it should
operate as a satisfaction/' (Italics added)
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Another excellent case consistent with the Dillman
case is the following Utah U. S. District Court case:
Nevada Half Moon Mining Co. vs. Combined
Metals Reduction Co., 1949 Utah Federal District
Court Case 176 Federal 2nd 73.
The District Court held for the defendant finding
there was an accord and satisfaction but the Court of
Appeals reversed in favor of the plaintiff finding that
a payment of a royalty to grantor of mining property
pursuant to contract by check reciting it was in full
payment of items listed on voucher attached to statement and settlement sheet after a controversy arose respecting payment did not constitute an effective discharge of grantee's obligation. There were several payments by check; each check recited it was in full payment and was accompanied by detailed statements. Each
check was accepted, endorsed and cashed.
The Court went on to say:
"Essential elements of an effective accord and
satisfaction are proper subject matter, competent parties, meeting of minds of parties and
consideration, and its most common pattern is
a mutual agreement between parties in which
one pays or performs and another accepts payment or performance in satisfaction of claim or
demand which is a bona fide dispute.''
Certainly this case reflects the law in the State of
Utah. This ruling doesTcsanction one mi forcing on a
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party a contract which was not intended. I n our case
there are not nearly as many elements which would tend
to show an accord and satisfaction as in the Federal case
yet this court found there was no accord and satisfaction. (Italics added)
POINT III
T H E COURT E R R O R E D IN A L L O W I N G
D E F E N D A N T $239.76 R E P A I R COSTS ON A
COURTESY BUS L O A N E D TO D E F E N D A N T
F R E E OF CHARGE AND IN DENYING
P L A I N T I F F S C L A I M F O R $845.00 COSTS TO
O V E R H A U L T H E MOTOR W H E N D E F E N DANT R E T U R N E D T H E BUS IN AN INOPE R A T I V E CONDITION.
Because of the defendant's concern about its need
during the summer for another bus the plaintiff located
a bus in Boise, Idaho, bought it for $1816.00, drove
it to Salt Lake City and turned it over to defendant for
its use without charge in July 1972. (R. 57-59, 120)
There was no obligation by contract to provide the
bus; it was turned over to Little America strictly as a
courtesy without charge. (R. 60, 98)
The defendant returned the bus in about December, 1972 in such poor condition that it had to have a
complete motor overhaul at a cost to plaintiff of
$845.00. (R. 80) The defendant never so much as questioned this cost at the trial and yet the lower Court com-
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pletely ignored the claim as originally set forth in plaintiff s Reply.
The bus traveled 250 miles a day. (R. 112, 113)
I t traveled during the heaviest traffic time during the
busiest and hottest time of the year. (R. 119) Driving
a bus fully loaded in the heat of the summer 250 miles
a day is extremely heavy use and very hard on any type
of equipment. The defendant surely knew they must
at least repair the vericle if they received the equipment,
tires, etc. free of charge. They would have to repair
their own equipment as part of their operating expense
surely the court can not hold the plaintiff to repair the equipment when it had been turned over to defendant for use as its own without any charge. The defendant literally burned up the motor and then demanded the plaintiff pay for sum $239.76 for motor repairs
repairs near the end of November, 1972. The cost of
these repairs were assessed against the plaintiff by the
lower Court without justification and wholly in error.
W e hope the court will consider how ridiculous it
is to penalize the plaintiff for the defendant's damage
to a free bus when defendant should be paying the plaintiff at the rate of $62.00 or $75.00 per day (cost of renting a bus R. 112). Using the lower figure of $62.00 at
a conservative use period of four months the total rental
value of plaintiff's contribution was at least $7,440. The
defendant tried to claim other cost incurred before December. The court permitted testimony on these matters
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over the objections of plaintiff's counsel though the
judgment did not include these costs.
The court allowed testimony on costs of operating
a bus and testimony on the reasonableness of such cost
from Mr. Knight who was shown by the Voir Dire questions of plaintiff's attorney to not be qualified as a sufficient expert to do so. (R. 107)
Mr. Knight is a business man, an office man (R.
108) with offices principally in Salt Lake City. Little
America has a manager in Wyoming who takes charge
of the buses, dispatches them and sees that buses are
available, fueled and repaired. This Wyoming Manager
also arranged for the rental of buses. (R. 107) Mr.
Knight's testimony concerning costs was allowed over
the objections of the plaintiff. (R. 108) The witnessed
was clearly mixed up in referring to costs of operating and costs of renting a bus. The court cannot from
the evidence here determine how charges should be assessed even if they were justified. (R. 112, 114) Mr.
Knight stated the 22 to 25 cents per mile he was charging the plaintiff included fuel and oil (R. 114). I t
should be obvious to the court that fuel and oil would
have to be paid if defendant was using its own bus. The
cost of fuel should not have been assessed against
plaintiff. This shows defendants' figures are all off because Mr. Knight arrived at his $62.50 per day figure
by multiplying 250 per mile times 250 miles per day.
There was no testimony concerning the need for the
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service nor covering the reasonableness of the $239.76.
No mechanic appeared to justify the charge.
POINT IV
T H E COURT E R R O R E D I N A L L O W I N G
D E F E N D A N T ' S COST I N R E N T I N G A B U S
BE ASSESSED AGAINST T H E P L A I N T I F F
AND FOR ALLOWING UNREASONABLE
COSTS TO B E A S S E S S E D .
There is absolutely nothing in the agreement between the parties that would permit defendant to claim
damages against the plaintiff for a delay in delivery.
Some contracts are written that way but this contract
did not provide for relief if delivery was not made as
required. As stated before no new contract was entered
into. Mr. Knight arbitrarily set December 1, 1972 as
some sort of a cut off date and unilaterally agreed with
himself that this was a good time to start assessing
charges. Apparently he based this on the fact that Mr.
Knaus thought, after checking with the factory, that the
bus would be ready for delivery the last of November.
Mr. Knaus made no promises, no guarantees and no
agreements; he merely told Mr. Knight that he "felt
confident" it could be delivered near the last of November. There was no agreements, oral or otherwise, or any
other basis upon which defendant could base a claim.
The charges assessed by the defendant were excessive. A bus could have been rented for much less by the
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month. At the rate of $75 a day the defendant would
have paid out $27,375 a year if it was a seven day week
operation. If the costs of operating were 25 cents per
mile as stated by Mr. Knight (R. 114) a good share
of that would be costs of fuel and oil (R. 114) which
would have to be paid by defendant anyhow and should
not be a part of the charges against the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
A clear look at the law as well as good legal reasoning shows that the lower court was in error and that
there was no Accord and Satisfaction which would bar
the plaintiff from recovery of the balance due and owing
on the contract of $3,407.26. Even if the court could
find an Accord and Satisfaction there is no basis for
defendant to claim plaintiff should pay it's cost for hiring a bus when there is no provision for recovery in case
of delayed delivery in the contract.
The assessment of $239.76 against plaintiff to repair a bus that plaintiff had bought for and practically
given to defendant borders on and arbitrary and capricious action by the lower court. On the other hand
to ignore the claim of plaintiff for repair costs of $845.00
for damage done to the bus by the defendant when they
had free use of it for four to five months is almost equally arbitrary and capricious.
W H E R E F O R E , we pray the Honorable Court
reverse the lower court and award the plaintiff judgment for the sum of $3,407.26 at the rate of 18 percent
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interest per annum from January 16,1973, with $845.00
damages at the rate of 6% interest from the same time,
costs of this action and reasonable attorney's fees of
$1500.00.
Dated this 26th day of July, 1974.
Respectfully submitted,
K E I T H E. SOHM
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Appellant
330 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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